▣ Skill Poison — Knowledge ExplorerONLINE / EDITION 10
AGENT SKILLS / SECURITY
Independent. Open. Curious.
PRIMARY RESEARCH & MAINTAINER DOCUMENTATION

Follow the evidence.
Keep its context.

A curated source catalog. Each entry states the question, contribution, and limits so you can interpret the work before applying it.

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Evidence is specific. A benchmark result belongs to its tasks, model, permissions, and scoring. Preprints are labeled as preprints. Catalog notes summarize source material; they are not independent replication.
S13Preprint2026

Towards Secure Agent Skills: Architecture, Threat Taxonomy, and Security Analysis ↗

Zhiyuan Li et al.

arXiv v2 · revised 14 October 2026

The 14 October revision maps 19 threat scenarios and seven documented incidents across the skill lifecycle.

Question

Which risks come from the format, and which from runtime choices?

Why it matters

Separates structural exposure, public evidence, and mitigation feasibility.

Read with care

Use v2 rather than mixing its taxonomy with the earlier version. This is a systematization, not a universal incident census.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / project documentation · 17 October 2026

TaxonomyLifecycle
Read the primary source ↗
S35Journal article2026

SchemaGuard: Structure-Aware Detection of Tool-Poisoning and Skill-File Attacks in the LLM Agent Tool Supply Chain ↗

Salam Al-E’mari et al.

Journal article · published online 14 October 2026

A journal article proposes pre-integration review of MCP tool manifests and skill files, using structural analysis and light dynamic checks.

Question

Can package structure improve review before an agent admits a new tool or skill?

Why it matters

Tests a hybrid screening approach across constructed attack families and held-out categories.

Read with care

Published online in Computers, Materials & Continua. The publisher abstract reports F1 of 0.946 in a random split and 0.883 in held-out categories; neither is a production guarantee. Full PDF methods were not reviewed here.

Record checked

Publisher metadata and abstract; full PDF not reviewed · 17 October 2026

DetectionAdmission
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S37Preprint2026

One Skill, Two Masters: Serving Users and Attackers through Skill Injection ↗

Haochang Hao et al.

arXiv v3 · revised 13 October 2026; formerly POISE

The revised PERSIST study explores a skill that satisfies the visible user task while carrying an attacker-desired extra action in a separate imported module.

Question

Can task completion conceal a second action in a reusable skill package?

Why it matters

Links instruction review to code imports and side effects across controlled agent configurations.

Read with care

A controlled evaluation using SkillsBench and Skill-Inject settings; it does not establish field frequency. Earlier versions used the title POISE; this is the same arXiv work, not a second paper.

Record checked

Publisher full HTML revision reviewed · 17 October 2026

Dual behaviorCode modules
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S42Industry research2026

ClawHub Malicious Skills Report — October 2026 ↗

IronHeights research team

Vendor report · 12 October 2026

A vendor tracker links public skill reports to sources and explains its case-counting and scanner-fixture methods.

Question

How can a case tracker avoid double-counting overlapping reports?

Why it matters

States whether records are single skills, campaigns, or studies, and provides a dated coverage ledger.

Read with care

Its 22 entries mix cases, campaigns, and studies; statuses are not independently rechecked and tests use harmless reconstructions, not original malware. It is also a vendor page about its own scanner. Do not sum entries as unique victims or infections.

Record checked

Full report methodology and limitations reviewed · 17 October 2026

Case trackerOverlap
Read the primary source ↗
S21Preprint2026

MetaCascade: End-to-End Attacks on Agent Skills via Metadata-Only Poisoning ↗

Junhao Wen et al.

arXiv v1

Studies metadata influence across retrieval, skill selection, and downstream behavior.

Question

Can selection-time content affect the complete action chain?

Why it matters

Evaluates metadata-only poisoning in two agent environments.

Read with care

Reported improvements belong to the paper’s datasets, baselines, and settings. They are not general failure rates.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / project documentation · 17 October 2026

MetadataSelection
Read the primary source ↗
S38Preprint2026

Understanding and Mitigating Cross-Session Attacks via Persistent Artifacts in Agent Skill Composition ↗

Dianshu Liao et al.

arXiv v1 · 9 October 2026

SkillRelayBench evaluates how attacker-controlled skills can coordinate through artifacts that survive a session reset.

Question

What changes when a downstream skill trusts an artifact written in an earlier session?

Why it matters

Models an upstream and downstream skill pair with persistent state, and evaluates a proposed SkillRelayGuard defense.

Read with care

The threat model assumes control of multiple third-party skills and surviving artifacts; 270 constructed cases across 30 scenarios and 10 domains are not live incidents. The reported defense gains apply to the evaluated systems.

Record checked

Publisher full HTML manuscript and threat model reviewed · 17 October 2026

CompositionPersistent artifacts
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S22Preprint2026

SkillPoison: Progressive Skill Poisoning via Successful Experiences ↗

Lizhi Zhang et al.

arXiv v1 · full HTML manuscript reviewed

Tests whether locally correct, verified experiences can induce an overgeneralized reusable behavior across three benchmarks and two skill-formation pipelines.

Question

Can task-correct experience still teach an unsafe reusable rule?

Why it matters

Separates task success during skill formation from later misapplication outside the original conditions.

Read with care

The reported 95.71% attack success is the PAWS / Trace2Skill / fifteen-experience condition, not a general rate. The corresponding DS1000 condition is 36.64%. Controlled tasks do not measure deployment prevalence. This independent site is not affiliated with the authors.

Record checked

Publisher HTML manuscript, methods and result tables reviewed · 17 October 2026

ExperienceGeneralization
Read the primary source ↗
S34Documentation2026

SecureAI-Scan — OWASP GenAI Security Project solution listing ↗

OWASP GenAI Security Project solution directory

Directory listing · 4 October 2026

A project directory listing describes an offline static scanner that includes installed Agent Skills and labels findings proven, likely, or heuristic.

Question

How does one published scanner describe finding severity and evidence?

Why it matters

An example of reporting evidence tiers and traces instead of presenting every static finding as a confirmed event.

Read with care

The directory listing describes a tool; it is not an independent benchmark, product endorsement, or proof that the scanner detects every poisoned skill. Current implementation was not tested here.

Record checked

Publisher directory entry; tool not independently tested · 17 October 2026

ScannerEvidence tiers
Read the primary source ↗
S32Preprint2026

Hiding in Plain Sight: Decoupling Pretext from Actuation for Skill Poisoning in LLM Agents ↗

Wenxin Wu et al.

arXiv v1 · 30 September 2026

An abstract-level account of a coordinated attack in which one skill changes context and another performs the resulting action.

Question

Can a downstream operation appear justified because an upstream skill changed the evidence it sees?

Why it matters

Separates the reason offered for an action from the action itself, across linked skills and persistent state.

Read with care

The indexed arXiv abstract was checked; full methods and results were not independently inspected. This is a controlled research proposal, not a documented field breach or a measured prevalence.

Record checked

Indexed arXiv abstract; full text not reviewed · 17 October 2026

CompositionPersistent artifacts
Read the primary source ↗
S07Conference paper2026 · ICML

SkillTrojan: Backdoor Attacks on Skill-Based Agent Systems ↗

Yunhao Feng et al.

Publisher record · checked 15 October 2026

Studies malicious logic in skill implementations and how skill composition can assemble and activate a hidden behavior.

Question

Can a risk emerge across several skill invocations?

Why it matters

Draws attention to composition and execution, beyond inspecting one instruction file.

Read with care

Published results apply to the paper’s representative agent setting and trigger configurations.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / official documentation · 17 October 2026

BackdoorsComposition
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S09Preprint2026

SkillSecurer: Detecting and Patching Prompt-Injection Vulnerabilities in AI Agent Skills ↗

Donato Mecca et al.

Publisher record · checked 15 October 2026

Presents an agentic framework for locating injection risks in complete skill packages and proposing patches.

Question

Can analysis provide actionable evidence and remediation?

Why it matters

Explores localization and patch verification, rather than a package-level flag alone.

Read with care

Detection performance is conditional on backend and evaluation configuration. No reported scanner result is a safety certificate.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / official documentation · 17 October 2026

DetectionRemediation
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S16Preprint2026

MaliciousSkillBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Malicious Agent Skill Detection ↗

Yue Wang et al.

arXiv v1

Consolidates 9,740 skills from 13 public sources for controlled detection evaluation.

Question

Will a detector generalize beyond familiar sources?

Why it matters

Compares random, structural-disjoint, and source-disjoint protocols.

Read with care

A curated malicious-heavy benchmark is not a prevalence estimate. Report benign false positives as well as detection.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / project documentation · 17 October 2026

BenchmarkGeneralization
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S15Preprint2026

SkillJack: Persistent Skill Backdoors in Self-Evolving Agents ↗

Zonghao Ying et al.

arXiv v2 · revised 7 August 2026

Studies how poisoned interaction histories can become persistent reusable skills in self-evolving agents.

Question

Does removing source experience also remove the learned behavior?

Why it matters

Distinguishes temporary context from the durable skill it helps create.

Read with care

Evidence concerns the evaluated skill-evolution systems, not every memory or learning architecture.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / project documentation · 17 October 2026

ExperiencePersistence
Read the primary source ↗
S08Preprint2026

Agent Skill Security: Threat Models, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation ↗

Sanket Badhe and Priyanka Tiwari

Publisher record · checked 15 October 2026

Presents SkillSec-Eval and examines risks across admission, retrieval, selection, execution, and skill evolution.

Question

Where in the skill lifecycle can security fail?

Why it matters

A lifecycle-aware framing evaluated on a repository of 327 real-world skills.

Read with care

Framework results depend on its repository, implementation, and threat assumptions.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / official documentation · 17 October 2026

LifecycleEvaluation
Read the primary source ↗
S40Preprint2026

SkillMutator: Benchmarking and Defending Language-and-Code Cross-modal Attacks on LLM Agent Skills ↗

Youngduk Kim, Minkyoo Song, and Seungwon Shin

arXiv v1 · 12 June 2026

A constructed benchmark studies attacks that cross skill instructions and bundled code, with install-time detector evaluations.

Question

Can a reviewer assess language and code together instead of screening them separately?

Why it matters

Describes thirteen mutation categories and scanner comparisons on the authors’ selected settings.

Read with care

The reported scanner detection ranges and improved distilled-model result refer to the constructed benchmark and a selected 76-sample subset. The publisher abstract was indexed; full manuscript could not be directly inspected in this review.

Record checked

Indexed publisher abstract; full text not reviewed · 17 October 2026

Code and languageDetection
Read the primary source ↗
S24Preprint2026

MalSkillBench: A Runtime-Verified Benchmark of Malicious Agent Skills ↗

Wenbo Guo et al.

arXiv v3 · revised 19 June 2026

Evaluates instruction-and-code detection using runtime-verified adversarial samples and benign comparisons.

Question

How does sample composition affect scanner conclusions?

Why it matters

Connects package instructions, executable behavior, and verification evidence.

Read with care

The collected wild subset is campaign-concentrated. Sandbox verification is not an estimate of real-world frequency.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / project documentation · 17 October 2026

BenchmarkRuntime verification
Read the primary source ↗
S41Conference paper2026

SkillSpector: A Pre-Publication Security Control for Agent Skills ↗

SkillSpector research team

AgentSkills 2026 workshop · indexed PDF

A workshop paper describes pre-publication review across metadata, instructions, permissions, dependencies, and code.

Question

What can a whole-package scanner make visible before publication?

Why it matters

Pairs deterministic checks with advisory semantic analysis and reports reviewable findings.

Read with care

Its 178-skill field exercise is unlabeled; the authors do not claim precision, recall, or ecosystem accuracy. The indexed PDF was available but the full manuscript was not directly reviewed here. Living repository counts can differ from the paper.

Record checked

Indexed publisher PDF abstract and official project repository; full PDF not reviewed · 17 October 2026

ScannerPre-publication
Read the primary source ↗
S36Industry research2026

Agent Context Poisoning: SKILL.md and the New AI Supply Chain Attack Surface ↗

Cloud Security Alliance AI Safety Initiative

Research note · 6 May 2026

An industry research note treats skill instructions as a supply-chain and trust-boundary concern.

Question

Why should instruction-bearing skill packages have provenance and containment review?

Why it matters

Organizes practical risks in instruction text, dependencies, and downstream authority.

Read with care

A synthesis and guidance note, not an independent incident count or benchmark result.

Record checked

Full organization research note reviewed · 17 October 2026

ProvenanceGuidance
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S33Preprint2026

RouteGuard: Internal-Signal Detection of Skill Poisoning in LLM Agents ↗

Wenjie Xiao et al.

arXiv v1 · full HTML and limitations reviewed

Studies pre-execution detection using response-conditioned attention and hidden-state alignment, evaluated on selected skill benchmarks.

Question

Can model-internal signals improve screening of malicious instructions inside an instruction-bearing skill?

Why it matters

Frames skill review as detecting instruction competition in material that legitimately instructs an agent.

Read with care

The authors state this is pre-execution detection, not live-agent prevention. Controlled channel probes, representative open-weight backbones, and reproduced baselines limit deployment claims.

Record checked

Publisher HTML manuscript and limitations reviewed · 17 October 2026

DetectionModel internals
Read the primary source ↗
S06Preprint2026

BadSkill: Backdoor Attacks on Agent Skills via Model-in-Skill Poisoning ↗

Guiyao Tie et al.

Publisher record · checked 15 October 2026

Examines skills that bundle a learned model, using an OpenClaw-inspired simulation to study triggered malicious behavior.

Question

Can a skill carry a backdoor inside its bundled model?

Why it matters

Identifies model-bearing skills as a distinct supply-chain surface.

Read with care

The evaluated simulations and model artifacts define the scope. This is not evidence of a compromise in every model-bearing skill.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / official documentation · 17 October 2026

BackdoorsModel artifacts
Read the primary source ↗
S14Preprint2026

Supply-Chain Poisoning Attacks Against LLM Coding Agent Skill Ecosystems ↗

Yubin Qu et al.

arXiv v1; official repository describes manuscript revision 450d7bc · 30 September 2026

Examines malicious logic carried inside documentation examples and configuration templates.

Question

Can apparently helpful examples influence executable output?

Why it matters

Studies the documentation-to-action boundary in coding-agent workflows.

Read with care

Evaluation starts after loading; discovery and installation are outside scope. Generated code and executed operations are separate outcomes. The repository describes a later manuscript than arXiv v1.

Record checked

Publisher abstract and official project README · 17 October 2026

DocumentationCoding agents
Read the primary source ↗
S27Industry research2026

Anatomy of a Deception: Uncovering the omnicogg Dropper in ClawHub ↗

David Cohen · JFrog Security Research

Publisher report checked 15 October 2026

Analyzes a padded README and discrepancies between a package viewer and the upstream artifact.

Question

What was observed, and which trust boundary mattered?

Why it matters

Primary evidence supporting the case archive and practical review questions.

Read with care

Historical scanner findings and resource-limit explanations are attributed to the researchers, not independently retested here.

Record checked

Publisher report text reviewed; artifacts not executed · 17 October 2026

Case evidenceSkill supply chain
Read the primary source ↗
S04Preprint2026

Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks ↗

David Schmotz et al.

Publisher record · checked 15 October 2026

Introduces a benchmark of 202 injection-task pairs for measuring harmful instruction avoidance alongside legitimate task compliance.

Question

How do agents respond to injections carried by skill files?

Why it matters

A benchmark that considers security and utility together.

Read with care

Attack success depends on the evaluated model, client, permissions, tasks, and scoring rules; it is not a universal production rate.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / official documentation · 17 October 2026

Prompt injectionEvaluation
Read the primary source ↗
S05Preprint2026

SkillJect: Automating Stealthy Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Coding Agents with Trace-Driven Closed-Loop Refinement ↗

Xiaojun Jia et al.

Publisher record · checked 15 October 2026

Studies automated skill-based injection and uses execution traces to evaluate whether targeted behavior occurred.

Question

Can skill attacks be adapted to realistic coding workflows?

Why it matters

Connects skill instructions, auxiliary scripts, and observed agent actions.

Read with care

A research attack setup does not prove an arbitrary package or current client is compromised.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / official documentation · 17 October 2026

Prompt injectionCoding agents
Read the primary source ↗
S26Industry research2026

How a Malicious Google Skill on ClawHub Tricks Users Into Installing Malware ↗

Liran Tal · Snyk

Publisher report checked 15 October 2026

Examines a Google-branded skill that directs the operator to a fabricated prerequisite installer.

Question

What was observed, and which trust boundary mattered?

Why it matters

Primary evidence supporting the case archive and practical review questions.

Read with care

Published package analysis, not a victim census. A human-executed installer and agent-executed code are distinct paths.

Record checked

Publisher report text reviewed; artifacts not executed · 17 October 2026

Case evidenceSkill supply chain
Read the primary source ↗
S31Documentation2026

OpenClaw Partners with VirusTotal for Skill Security ↗

Peter Steinberger, Jamieson O’Reilly, Bernardo Quintero

Publisher report checked 15 October 2026

Maintainer announcement describing package hashing, scanning, verdicts, and rescanning.

Question

What was observed, and which trust boundary mattered?

Why it matters

Primary evidence supporting the case archive and practical review questions.

Read with care

A dated description of a defensive workflow. Maintainers explicitly state that a clean scan is not a safety guarantee.

Record checked

Publisher report text reviewed; artifacts not executed · 17 October 2026

Case evidenceSkill supply chain
Read the primary source ↗
S12Conference paper2026

“Do Not Mention This to the User”: Detecting and Understanding Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild ↗

Yi Liu et al.

arXiv v4 · revised 10 June 2026

A study of 98,380 registry skills reports 157 behaviorally confirmed malicious packages.

Question

What separates malicious behavior from a suspicious pattern?

Why it matters

Combines static analysis and behavioral verification; the arXiv record reports acceptance at USENIX Security 2026.

Read with care

Sample, verification method, and collection period bound the findings. Counts are not current registry prevalence.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / project documentation · 17 October 2026

MarketplaceObserved behavior
Read the primary source ↗
S25Industry research2026

ClawHavoc: Analysis of Large-Scale Poisoning Campaign Targeting the OpenClaw Skill Market for AI Agents ↗

Antiy CERT

Publisher report checked 15 October 2026

Campaign analysis of malicious marketplace packages and prerequisite-based malware delivery.

Question

What was observed, and which trust boundary mattered?

Why it matters

Primary evidence supporting the case archive and practical review questions.

Read with care

Vendor sample analysis; English page is an AI-translated edition. Counts reflect that investigation and overlap other reports.

Record checked

Publisher report text reviewed; artifacts not executed · 17 October 2026

Case evidenceSkill supply chain
Read the primary source ↗
S17Industry research2026

Exploring the Threat Landscape of Agent Skills — ToxicSkills ↗

Snyk Security Research

Research post · published 5 February 2026

Reports an analysis of 3,984 skills and 76 confirmed malicious payloads.

Question

What behaviors did a vendor investigation find in public skills?

Why it matters

Connects skill instructions with executable and credential-related risk.

Read with care

Vendor methodology, collection date, and counting rules apply. Findings are not an independent census or a current infection rate.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / project documentation · 17 October 2026

MarketplaceVendor research
Read the primary source ↗
S30Industry research2026

From Automation to Infection: How OpenClaw AI Agent Skills Are Being Weaponized ↗

Bernardo Quintero · VirusTotal

Publisher report checked 15 October 2026

Describes package-focused analysis of malicious skills and Code Insight support.

Question

What was observed, and which trust boundary mattered?

Why it matters

Primary evidence supporting the case archive and practical review questions.

Read with care

Vendor analysis and capability announcement, not an independent comparative test or complete registry survey.

Record checked

Publisher report text reviewed; artifacts not executed · 17 October 2026

Case evidenceSkill supply chain
Read the primary source ↗
S29Industry research2026

Malicious ClawHub Skills Target OpenClaw Users ↗

OpenSourceMalware research team

Report updated 3 February 2026

Documents early malicious skill uploads and misleading authentication prerequisites.

Question

What was observed, and which trust boundary mattered?

Why it matters

Primary evidence supporting the case archive and practical review questions.

Read with care

Report updated 2–3 February 2026. Its snapshots can overlap ClawHavoc reporting; totals must not be added.

Record checked

Publisher report text reviewed; artifacts not executed · 17 October 2026

Case evidenceSkill supply chain
Read the primary source ↗
S03Preprint2026

Agent Skills in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities at Scale ↗

Yi Liu et al.

Publisher record · checked 15 October 2026

Examines a large sample of marketplace skills using a multi-stage security analysis framework.

Question

What kinds of vulnerabilities appear in published skills?

Why it matters

An empirical taxonomy and a dataset for investigating skill ecosystem risk.

Read with care

Marketplace selection and scanner performance affect the findings. Reported prevalence is not a measurement of every skill ecosystem.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / official documentation · 17 October 2026

Supply chainDetection
Read the primary source ↗
S39Preprint2025

Agent Skills Enable a New Class of Realistic and Trivially Simple Prompt Injections ↗

David Schmotz, Sahar Abdelnabi, and Maksym Andriushchenko

arXiv preprint · 30 October 2025

An early skill-specific demonstration of prompt injection against agents that treat skill content as instruction.

Question

How can a normal skill-loading workflow carry adversarial directions?

Why it matters

Provides historical context for later skill-specific benchmarks and defenses.

Read with care

Controlled demonstrations should not be mistaken for a deployment-wide frequency or an all-client failure claim.

Record checked

Publisher manuscript record reviewed · 17 October 2026

FoundationsInjection
Read the primary source ↗
S02Documentation2025

Equipping agents for the real world with Agent Skills ↗

Anthropic Engineering

Publisher record · checked 15 October 2026

Introduces reusable skill folders and discusses security implications of third-party instructions, scripts, and external resources.

Question

How are skills loaded and used?

Why it matters

Maintainer guidance on reviewing skills and the capabilities they introduce.

Read with care

Product behavior evolves; verify the current client and permission model in your environment.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / official documentation · 17 October 2026

FormatSecurity
Read the primary source ↗
S01DocumentationLiving specification

Agent Skills format specification ↗

Agent Skills maintainers

Publisher record · checked 15 October 2026

Defines the package structure, metadata, instructions, and optional resources that form an Agent Skill.

Question

What does a skill package contain?

Why it matters

A primary reference for the format and its progressive loading model.

Read with care

Format compliance does not establish that a package is safe. Client support for experimental fields can differ.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / official documentation · 17 October 2026

FormatDiscovery
Read the primary source ↗
S10Documentation2025

Making Claude Code more secure and autonomous with sandboxing ↗

Anthropic Engineering

Publisher record · checked 15 October 2026

Explains why filesystem and network boundaries both matter for containing an agent.

Question

How can runtime boundaries limit the effect of an unsafe skill?

Why it matters

Maintainer engineering context for containment.

Read with care

Sandboxing is broader than skill poisoning. The relevant lesson here is constraining what skill-triggered execution can reach.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / official documentation · 17 October 2026

ContainmentPermissions
Read the primary source ↗
S11Documentation2026

Trustworthy agents in practice ↗

Anthropic Research

Publisher record · checked 15 October 2026

Discusses layered defenses and the importance of choices about agent tools, data, permissions, and environments.

Question

Why is one defense insufficient?

Why it matters

Maintainer context on combining model behavior defenses with system controls.

Read with care

General agent-security guidance; used here only where it directly supports skill-security design.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / official documentation · 17 October 2026

SecurityPermissions
Read the primary source ↗
S18Industry research2026

The Next AI Supply Chain Risk: Malicious Skills in Agentic AI ↗

Marta Janus and Jim Simpson · HiddenLayer

Publisher research page

Examines implicit trust in skill instructions and supporting executable behavior.

Question

Why should skills receive supply-chain scrutiny?

Why it matters

Industry analysis linking agent instructions, provenance, and runtime containment.

Read with care

An industry perspective, not a controlled cross-vendor benchmark. No precise publication date is asserted here.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / project documentation · 17 October 2026

Supply chainVendor research
Read the primary source ↗
S19Documentation2026

Cisco Skill Scanner — scope, engines, and limitations ↗

Cisco AI Defense maintainers

Living repository · checked 15 October 2026

Maintainer documentation for a best-effort scanner combining multiple analysis methods.

Question

What does a scanner inspect, and what remains outside its guarantees?

Why it matters

Documents analysis engines and the limits of a clean result.

Read with care

Configuration, model, version, and optional remote services matter. Listed here without endorsement or independent retesting.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / project documentation · 17 October 2026

ScannerDetection
Read the primary source ↗
S20Dataset2026

SkillTrustBench — dataset card ↗

Tencent Zhuque Lab / CUHK Zhuque project

Living dataset card · checked 15 October 2026

A labeled dataset for evaluating security analysis of agent skill packages.

Question

How can normal, suspicious, and malicious cases be distinguished?

Why it matters

Provides dataset documentation and structured labels for research.

Read with care

Check the exact release, label definitions, and noncommercial license before reuse. Labels are research evidence, not individual safety certificates.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / project documentation · 17 October 2026

BenchmarkLabels
Read the primary source ↗
S23Documentation2026

Adding skills support — client implementation guidance ↗

Agent Skills maintainers

Living documentation · checked 15 October 2026

Maintainer implementation guidance for discovering packages and parsing metadata and body content.

Question

Where does a host introduce skill information into the agent?

Why it matters

Connects the package format to client implementation choices.

Read with care

Living implementation guidance does not certify the behavior of a particular host.

Record checked

Publisher abstract / project documentation · 17 October 2026

ImplementationLoading
Read the primary source ↗
S28Industry research2026

OpenClaw’s Skill Marketplace and the Emerging AI Supply Chain Threat ↗

Unit 42 · Palo Alto Networks

Publisher report checked 15 October 2026

Reports five skill findings from a February–May 2026 analysis, including malware delivery and recommendation manipulation.

Question

What was observed, and which trust boundary mattered?

Why it matters

Primary evidence supporting the case archive and practical review questions.

Read with care

Observation window is recorded separately from publication date. Cases overlap prior campaigns; no current prevalence or victim count is inferred.

Record checked

Publisher report text reviewed; artifacts not executed · 17 October 2026

Case evidenceSkill supply chain
Read the primary source ↗
SELECTED PUBLICATION MILESTONES

How the discussion
has developed.

Selected source dates, not a claim about priority or a complete history. Dates are initial publication dates unless a record explicitly says otherwise.

Equipping agents for the real world with Agent SkillsResearch publication
Agent Skills Enable a New Class of Realistic and Trivially Simple Prompt InjectionsPreprint submission
Agent Skills in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities at ScalePreprint submission
Malicious ClawHub Skills Target OpenClaw UsersResearch publication
From Automation to Infection: How OpenClaw AI Agent Skills Are Being WeaponizedResearch publication
Exploring the Threat Landscape of Agent Skills — ToxicSkillsResearch publication
“Do Not Mention This to the User”: Detecting and Understanding Malicious Agent Skills in the WildResearch publication
ClawHavoc: Analysis of Large-Scale Poisoning Campaign Targeting the OpenClaw Skill Market for AI AgentsResearch publication
OpenClaw Partners with VirusTotal for Skill SecurityResearch publication
How a Malicious Google Skill on ClawHub Tricks Users Into Installing MalwareResearch publication
SkillJect: Automating Stealthy Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Coding Agents with Trace-Driven Closed-Loop RefinementPreprint submission
Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File AttacksPreprint submission
Anatomy of a Deception: Uncovering the omnicogg Dropper in ClawHubResearch publication
Towards Secure Agent Skills: Architecture, Threat Taxonomy, and Security AnalysisPreprint submission
Supply-Chain Poisoning Attacks Against LLM Coding Agent Skill EcosystemsPreprint submission
BadSkill: Backdoor Attacks on Agent Skills via Model-in-Skill PoisoningPreprint submission
RouteGuard: Internal-Signal Detection of Skill Poisoning in LLM AgentsPreprint submission
Agent Context Poisoning: SKILL.md and the New AI Supply Chain Attack SurfaceResearch publication
SkillSpector: A Pre-Publication Security Control for Agent SkillsResearch publication
MalSkillBench: A Runtime-Verified Benchmark of Malicious Agent SkillsPreprint submission
One Skill, Two Masters: Serving Users and Attackers through Skill InjectionPreprint submission
SkillMutator: Benchmarking and Defending Language-and-Code Cross-modal Attacks on LLM Agent SkillsPreprint submission
Agent Skill Security: Threat Models, Attacks, Defenses, and EvaluationPreprint submission
SkillJack: Persistent Skill Backdoors in Self-Evolving AgentsPreprint submission
MaliciousSkillBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Malicious Agent Skill DetectionPreprint submission
SkillSecurer: Detecting and Patching Prompt-Injection Vulnerabilities in AI Agent SkillsPreprint submission
SkillTrojan: Backdoor Attacks on Skill-Based Agent SystemsProceedings publication
Hiding in Plain Sight: Decoupling Pretext from Actuation for Skill Poisoning in LLM AgentsPreprint submission
SecureAI-Scan — OWASP GenAI Security Project solution listingResearch publication
SkillPoison: Progressive Skill Poisoning via Successful ExperiencesPreprint submission
Understanding and Mitigating Cross-Session Attacks via Persistent Artifacts in Agent Skill CompositionPreprint submission
MetaCascade: End-to-End Attacks on Agent Skills via Metadata-Only PoisoningPreprint submission
ClawHub Malicious Skills Report — October 2026Research publication
SchemaGuard: Structure-Aware Detection of Tool-Poisoning and Skill-File Attacks in the LLM Agent Tool Supply ChainResearch publication
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