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C04 / Published packageUnit 42 observation window: February–May 2026

money-radar: when the recommendation itself is the target

A skill can distort advice and destinations without needing to resemble a conventional malware binary.

EVIDENCE CLASSPublished package

Reported observations below are attributed to the linked sources. Review questions and controls are editorial interpretation.

What the source reports

Unit 42 describes money-radar as an advisor that fetched publisher-controlled referral data and required affiliate links in recommendations. Its analysis identifies recommendation routing as the relevant manipulation and says the reported accounts and skills were removed after disclosure.

Primary records: S28 ↗

The trust boundary

Remote product data influenced both the advice and the destinations presented to the user.

What this does not establish

This file summarizes the researchers’ reported mechanism. It does not independently establish user losses, payment flows, or legal conclusions. Affiliate links by themselves do not establish maliciousness.

We reviewed the linked publication text or cataloged evidence level. We did not execute the suspect package, independently reproduce the investigation, or verify current registry availability.

Questions for a review

These are practical questions prompted by the case, not controls independently validated by this website.

User objective
Which criteria did the user actually authorize for the recommendation?
Mutable control
Can a remote source change both the candidate products and the destinations without a package revision?
Disclosure
Does the result make the relevant incentives and source limitations understandable to the reader?

Editorial lesson

Review output incentives, selection criteria, and destination provenance alongside code and permissions.

For your own environment, turn the question into a bounded test with an exact package identity, synthetic input, expected permitted behavior, prohibited effect, and observable stopping point. Keep a blocked attempt distinct from a completed effect. Preserve the legitimate task result alongside the security observation.

Sources & reading path

S28
OpenClaw’s Skill Marketplace and the Emerging AI Supply Chain ThreatUnit 42 · Palo Alto Networks · Publisher report checked 15 October 2026
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Understand the mechanism

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